Verheugen versus Rawls: Who will make it to the Berlaymont?
J. Ignacio Torreblanca
January 15, 2007
Verheugen’s suggestion on how to distribute Commission’s seats in an enlarged EU reminded me of a recent experiment showing how superior primates have an inherent sense of justice. In the experiment, out of six chimpanzees in the cage, the first five were given a banana after having successfully completed their task. But the sixth was just given a carrot after having successfully completed the same task as his colleagues. Guess what happened. He got angry!
Importantly, the point with the chimpanzees is not about equality; it’s about justification. You may treat differently those who are equal, or treat equal those who are different, but you must justify it according to a principle. So, we may conclude, the chimpanzee did not get angry because he had been treated differently, but because discrimination was not justified.
Now, let us suppose for a moment that Günter Verheugen had been born in a small country. Would he consider fair that large member states had a first class post at the Commission while small member states should rotate or have second class status? Not easily. Why? Simply, because country size is not a valid organizing principle for attributing seats to an institution like the Commission. Constitutional politics have to take place under the Rawlsian principle of “veil of ignorance”, i.e. that rules have to be designed so as to be fair no matter the position you occupy in the system. Verheugen thus forgets that rules have to make reference to a legitimate organizing principle. Country size may matter, and it does indeed, when assigning voting rights in the Council of the European Union, as it does when assigning seats to the European Parliament (though in both cases proportionality is corrected to lift the smallest countries up). But in these two cases, we are talking about “representing” states (the Council) or citizens (the Parliament). When it comes to the European Commission, it’s European interests as a whole that we are seeking to preserve, so those who think that large member states represent European interests better than small member states must prove it.
In practice, however, evidence shows that small member states may be more loyal to the Community spirit that large member states. This is due to a Darwinist principle: you specialize in what you do best. If you are small, you know that you can’t twist anybody’s arms, so you specialize in arguing. In contrast, if you are big, you might be too often tempted to bully your neighbours in order to get your way through. As a consequence, your arguing capacity is impaired and your image as an honest broker put under question. This partly (though not wholly) explains why Finnish or Luxembourguese presidencies tend to perform better than French ones.
Taking into account that Commissioners must, by Statute, refrain from serving to national interests or receive instructions from national interests, one can easily see that Verheugen’s organizing principle (country size) is, by its very nature, against the finality of the institution. Therefore, the selection principle of Commissioners should exclusively be based on their capacity to serve European interests. True that this is a bit idealistic given men human (imperfect) nature. But one thing is admitting that a principle may not 100% applicable in practice and another thing is to reverse the principle so as to match a reality we disapprove.
Verheugen’s comments shows how little he knows or cares about how power must be organized and exercised in a democratic society. Should his vision be realised the EU would become a Hobbessian agreement in which “lions get the lion’s share”. But lions get the lion’s share not because they are better, but simply because they are stronger. In the IMF (a pretty hobbessian institution) voting rights are assigned in relation to the contributions to the budget. And in the UN Security Council (another hobbessian institution), only the big five (who happen to have nuclear weapons) have a permanent veto right. But could the EU assign voting rights according to GDP or assign permanent veto rights according to size and/or wealth? No. For the same reasons, Verheugen’s proposals will not fly off.
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Dear Jose Ignacio:
I totally agree with you that the Commission’s (German) Vicepresident declaration was cleary unfortunate and the real problem is that it possible reveals the position of thousands of citizens of the bigger countries of the Union.
However, let me add some riders to your post.
First: I don’t believe that the principle of independence of Commissioners -that must protect the European interests- from their home countries established in article 213 of EC Treaty is “a bit idealistic”, even if I recognize of course that we all are human beings, also Commissioners.
But if I would not have the full conviction that this principle is true and it is respected, I would be unable to believe not only in the Commission – as the European interest’ voice- but either in our national judicial power (Constitutional Court included) or in the European Courts.
Second: It seems we forget history very quickly. Until May 2004, the 5 bigger Member States, -among them, Spain-, have had the “unjustified” privilege of appointing two Commissioners while the rest of the countries only had one. Why this privilege that has be maintained for years and that, in my opinion, it has not justification at all taking into account that, as you, I believe that the Commission -that must be, in this matter, distinguishes from the Council and the European Parliament- represents the European interests as a whole? ….
So, maybe, we should not be neither surprise nor indignant about Verheugen’s suggestion, even if we -of course- do not share it.
I agree with you that the ideal would be that the selection principle of Commissioners should be exclusivily based on their capacity to serve European interests and in this sense I have seen as a big positive stept the right of veto that has been conferred to the European Parliament as regards, first, the appointed Commission’s President and, second, the whole Commission.
I believe that EP -that represents European people- is the right forum to evaluate the capacity of the candidates to really serve the European interest.
But, as you, we have come back to the departure: How to elect these candidates, if -I imagine- we all agree that in an Europe of 27 or more countries it is not workable to maintain a Commission with as many members as States?
And, to answer this question, I really have not seen yet a better solution -as Victor has already pointed out in this blog-that the one provided by artícle I.26.6 of the Draft Constitution Treaty: 2/3 of the members of the Member States appointed through a system of equal rotation between Member States.
Last but not least: probably you are right that evidence shows that small Member States may be more loyal to the Community spirit that large Member states. But as regards the Commission I think that the attitude and personality of each person has more weight that the country from where that person comes. Just two names as example: Delors (France) and Santer (Luxembourg).
Best regards,
María
Comment by Maria Lopez-Contreras Gonzalez — January 25, 2007 @ 9:25 pm
Thanks for the comment. The problem with the 2/3 system is very simple: it´s not stable. Moving the EU from 27 to 28, i.e. admitting Croatia, would require appointing one new Commissioner. The number of Commissioners should be stable so we would not need inventing new portfolios with every new round of enlargement. Why should an EU at 27 members have 17 Commisioners and an EU at 28 have 18 Commissioners just because 4.4 milion citizens have joined and EU of 470 million? The rational way of doing this is to define first what are the key responsibilities of the Commission. Maybe we end up with a College of 10 members which works smoothly!
Comment by Jose Ignacio Torreblanca — January 26, 2007 @ 3:58 pm
Your argument will be right if the European Community – so the Comission- would have “stable” responsabilities and powers. However, as you know, the integration process implies precisely that EU is -sometimes through amendments of the Treaty, but a lot of times without those amendments-, day by day, increasing its powers. So it would be worthless to established in a Treaty a fixed number of Commissioners taking into account the responsabilities that the EU has today, because that would probably change tommorrow. So I believe that the number of Commissioners should not be a fixed number but it would have to be decided by the nominated President of the Commission and the Goverments of the MS each five years. In any case, and besides how the number of Commissioners is decided, I believe that, as regards the method to appoint them, a system of equal rotation between Member States is the best choice.
Best Regards,
María
Comment by Maria Lopez-Contreras Gonzalez — January 31, 2007 @ 11:09 am