Plan B without a Plan B
José M. de Areilza
February 14, 2007
The European Union can cope with failure to ratify a European Constitution. Even if it is now evident that the 25 governments that solemnly adopted the Treaty in Rome on October 2004 had no Plan B, the rules of ratification were clear. Failure also meant respecting the democratic will of Europeans. But if the German driven attempt to rescue this text between now and 2009 fails, what would be the impact on the Union’s credibility? What is the Plan B of Plan B? Is it a good idea to try to reopen the constitutional debate, but only half way, limiting the agenda to favorite articles of Part I of the Constitution and push for an agreement in only a few months? What if “difficult” Member States decide to hold referenda after all on the new text and the no vote wins? What if some National Parliaments vote it down?
In my view, the Union has two clear options that are better than the Merkel-Sarkozy inspired “Plan B-with-no-Plan-B”. First option would be to “think big”, go back to square one, and dare to use again the lengthy method of European Convention + Intergovernmental Conference. We would renegotiate the rules of the game with an open agenda. Even if there is no resulting agreement or the new text would be considered by some as “sub-optimal”, this political process would enjoy high legitimacy. Second option, a minimalist one, wait until the accession of Croatia is about to happen, negotiate just enough institutional changes to bring this country in, continue with the existing Nice arrangements until the new political community of 27 Member states is more consolidated. Meanwhile concentrate on solving European substantive problems like competitiveness, energy, security, inmigration policy, that can be tackled with the existing rules, provided there is enough leadership.
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You are right in pointing out that a second “No” would be quite a drama for the European Union. Merkel & Co. are underestimating the likelihood of a second “No”. They still think that the problem is the text, and thus they are convinced that the solution is a new text. Soon we will see!
On the other hand, your two scenarios may be compatible. We could “think small” by way of the Accession Treaty of Croatia, and then “think big” with a new Convention and a new IGC after 2009. Of course, we run some serious risks because some countries may be tempted to run away from thinking big once they secure the mini-institutional reforms they want. But if they fail to deliver later on, the other member states would have the legitimacy to “think big” on their own and leave the others behind.
Europe may then evolve in two circles, the “Nice-plus-only group” and the “Constitutional group”. Therefore, to some people, a two-stage process is risky, but they may prefer it over a mini-treaty in one stage which would surely shelve for 20 years any possibility of real political integration.
Comment by JIT — February 15, 2007 @ 12:37 am
Despite the optimism apparent during the first few weeks of German Presidential tenure, the practical realities of intergovernmental bi-laterlism have now come to the fore; http://euobserver.com/9/23552
Progress in the negotiations (held in private backrooms between individual member state government officials – who said anything about these matters being open and transparent?) is paralysed because the French Presidential election season in now in full swing.
Everyone waits to see who will emerge as the likely victor – actors outside France do not dare to display tacit preference for any individual candidate because this would be interpreted as indirect interference in French internal politics – a faux pas of the worst possible kind.
This posturing is symbolic of the flaws inherent within the orthodoxy of a “Europe of Nations” geo-political template.
I think you should float your “think big” alternative, not that I believe it to be any more plausible than other options but simply because it is likely to find favour with individual member state actors (those who actually influence events).
Why do I think that? – Because it will have the effect of postponing, for a few more years, the day when a real decision about the future of Europe has to be made! No doubt that will have an appeal for many of the individuals involved.
Now what would be really innovative (and therefore unlikely to happen) is for a new European Convention to be initiated, followed by that most novel of ideas; a European conference, structured around the real foundations of Europe – its citizens!
Comment by Peter Davidson — February 25, 2007 @ 3:20 pm